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Abstract:
Information systems are used more and more in various fields in everyday life.
Broad usage of information systems means that security of these systems is vital.
The importance of bearing security in mind in early stages of developing new
systems has been acknowledged. One possible approach is to model security into
models when designing the system. This master thesis will give an overview what
is Information System Security Risk Management domain model and how secure
extensions of different modelling languages have been aligned to it. The main
output of this thesis is a developed tool which helps users learn and understand
those alignments as well as learn the process of how to transform models about
same system from one secure modelling language to another. In the final part of
the thesis, the created solution is validated.
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Rakendus toetamaks mitmevaatelise süsteemi arendamist tur-
variskide haldamise kaudu
Lühikokkuvõte:
Infosüsteemid leiavad tänapäeval järjest enam ja enam kasutust erinevates vald-
kondades. Laialdane infosüsteemide kasutamine tähendab, et nende süsteemide
turvalisus on ülimalt oluline. Aru on saadud, et tähtis on turvalisuse peale mõelda
juba süsteemide varajases arenguprotsessis. Üks võimalik lähenemine on model-
leerida turvalisus mudelitesse juba süsteemi disainimise faasis. Käesolev magist-
ritöö annab ülevaate, mis on infosüsteemi turvariski haldamise domeenimudel ja
kuidas erinevate modelleerimiskeelte turvalaiendused on selle domeeni mudeliga
joondatud. Töö põhiväljund on arendatud rakendus, mis aitab kasutajatel õppida
ja mõista eelpool mainitud joondusi ning õppida ka kuidas transformeerida sama
süsteem mudeleid erinevatesse modelleerimiskeeltesse. Töö viimases osas validee-
ritakse loodud lahendus.
Võtmesõnad:
Infosüsteemi turvariski haldamine, Turvariskiteadlik TROPOS, Turvariskile suu-
natud BPMN, Turvariskile suunatun Misuse Case diagrammid, Turva riskide hal-
damine Mal-Activity diagramme kasutades
CERCS:
T120 - Süsteemitehnoloogia, arvutitehnoloogia
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1 Introduction
Security risk management plays an important role in software system's develop-
ment. The concerns for addressing security from the beginning of system de-
velopment process is emphasised more and more [1]. Every modelling languages
illustrates different aspects of the system. This means that in order to see all
aspects of the system, more than one modelling language is often needed. Using
multiple languages for representing the same system means, that there is need
for transformations from one modelling language to another. Although multiple
automatic transformers between modelling languages exist, there is no tool which
would help with learning how to model in security risk-oriented languages and
help in learning and understanding the transformation process from one secure
modelling language to another.
This thesis gives an overview of what is domain model for information sys-
tems security risk management (ISSRM) and how it is used for secure modelling.
Four secure modelling languages: Security Risk-aware Secure TROPOS, Security
Risk-oriented BPMN, Security Risk-oriented Misuse cases and Mal-Activities for
Security Risk Management are chosen for this thesis. Already proposed alignments
between those modelling language constructs and ISSRM domain model concepts
are researched and taken as an input for the tool developed in this thesis.
The main aim of this thesis is to design and implement a tool, which can be used
by universities and students to teach and learn modelling in Security Risk-oriented
modelling languages. The tool helps the users understand how to create models in
these languages, which constructs to use, how they are connected to one another
and also shows the constructs alignments to ISSRM domain model concepts. Since
the tool supports four modelling languages mentioned earlier, potentially it could
be useful for learning how to transform between those four modelling languages,
while keeping security aspects intact. Following research questions are set for this
thesis.
1. RQ1: How are secure modelling languages aligned to ISSRM domain
model?
2. RQ2: What are the requirements for tool to help the users learn align-
ment to ISSRM domain model concepts and transformations between secure
modelling langauges?
3. RQ3: How easy is to learn modelling language alignment to ISSRM domain
model concepts using the proposed solution?
4. RQ4: How easy is to learn transformations between secure modelling
languages with help from tool which shows alignments to ISSRM domain
model concepts?
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This thesis is structured as follows. In this introduction chapter we explained
the motivation for this thesis set scope of which modelling languages are chosen
and also set research questions addressed in this thesis. In the second chapter we
answer research question 1 by researching chosen modelling languages and their
security risk-oriented extensions and how those extensions are currently proposed
to be aligned to ISSRM domain model. In third chapter we answer research
question 2 by identifying and analysing users goals and which scenarios are needed
for the user to achieve them. In the fourth chapter we answer research questions
3 and 4 by describing the validation process of the developed solution and results.
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2 Modelling Languages and Security Risk Man-
agement
This chapter will answer research question 1 "How are secure modelling languages
aligned to ISSRM domain model?". For doint that we describe what is domain
model for information systems security risk management and what concepts it
consists of. Then we are going to introduce security risk-aware secure TROPOS,
security risk-oriented BPMN, security risk-oriented misuse cases and mal-activities
for security risk management. We also give an overview of already proposed align-
ments between those modelling language constructs and ISSRM domain model
concepts.
2.1 Domain Model for Information Systems Security Risk
Management
Domain model for ISSRM was proposed in [2]. Figure 1 pictures the ISSRM do-
main model. Domain Model for Information Systems Security Risk Management
consists of three concept groups [2], [3]: asset related concepts, risk related con-
cepts, risk treatment related concepts. In figure 1 the asset related concepts are
colored yellow, risk related concepts red and risk treatment related concepts are
marked with green.
Description of ISSRM domain model is based on [2]. Asset related concepts
describe which assets in an organization are important to protect and what are
the criteria for assets security. An asset may be anything that is needed by the
company in order to achieve its objectives. Assets are divided into two: business
assets and information system (IS) assets. A business asset describes processes,
capabilities, skills and information essential for the business to achieve its objec-
tives. IS assets is a component or part of the information system and is needed
for achieving objectives. IS assets are usually immaterial. Security criteria, some-
times called security property is a constraint of business asset that characterizes
the security need for the asset. Security criteria are mostly expressed through
confidentiality, integrity and availability [2].
Risk related concepts define risk and its sub-components. Risk is a combination
of potentially harmful event and impact, which harm system assets. Impact is a
potential negative outcome of risk, which may harm assets and negate security
criterions. Event is a combination of threat and one or more vulnerabilities. A
vulnerability is a characteristic of an asset or assets, which exposes flaws in system
security. Vulnerabilities can be intentionally or accidentally exploited by threat.
A threat is an incident or an attack initiated by a threat agent, who uses an attack
method for targeting one or more IS assets by exploiting their vulnerabilities. A
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Figure 1: The ISSRM Domain Model [4]
threat agent is an agent who has means to initiate the attack and harm assets. An
attack method describes by which means the threat is executed by threat agent
[2].
Risk treatment related concepts consist of risk treatment, security requirements
and controls. Risk treatment decisions show how to treat identified risks. Risk
treatment decisions can be divided to four categories:
• Risk avoidance - Decision to avoid the identified risk. Systems functionality
is modified or discarded.
• Risk reduction - Actions to reduce risk probability. In order to reduce the
risk security requirements are selected.
• Risk transfer - Sharing the burden of loss from risk with third party.
• Risk retention - Accepting the risk and not changing system design.
A security requirement is a refinement of a risk treatment decision for mitigating
risk. Control is an implementation of a security requirement. Security controls
may be processes, policies, devices, practices or other components which act to
reduce risks [2].
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2.2 Security Risk-Aware Secure TROPOS
Tropos [5] approach consists of four phases: early requirements, late requirements,
architectural design and detailed design. Each phase complements existing model.
In early requirements phase the stakeholders are identified and modeled as social
actors. All actors depend on one another in order to achieve goals, complete plans
and provide resources. In late requirements phase new actor with its dependencies
is added to the model. The new actor represents system. Architectural design
phase breaks system down to subsystems. Subsystems are connected to each other
with data and control flows. Subsystems are represented by actors and flows are
represented as dependencies. The detailed design phase specifies each components
capabilities and interactions such as input, output and control [5].
Tropos consists of following main constructs:
1. Actor is an entity with strategic goals.
2. Goal is entity's strategic interest. Goals are divided into soft goals and
hard goals. Hard goals can be satisfied or not satisfied. Soft goals can be
satisficed.
3. Plan describes what needs to be done in order to achieve goals.
4. Resource is a physical or informational entity.
5. Dependency is a relationship between two actors. dependency expresses
how depender depends on the dependee in order to achieve a goal, execute
a plan or deliver a resource.
Secure Tropos [6] is an extension of tropos language. Secure Tropos is applied
in early requirements and late requirements phase. Secure Tropos introduces new
elements such as security constraint, secure dependency, secure goal and secure
plan. Security constraint represents a restriction related to security issues. Secure
dependency shows that actors depend on a security constraint to be satisfied.
Secure goals are used to express actors strategic interest in respect to security,
they are connected to actors using secure dependencies. Secure tasks describe how
to achieve secure goals. Attacks relationship shows what is the attacker targeting
with plan. Security Risk-aware Secure TROPOS describes the alignment between
ISSRM domain model concepts and Secure TROPOS approach [4]. This alignment
of Secure TROPOS constructs to ISSRM domain model concepts is shown in Table
1.
Secure Tropos has many models, which support analysing security considera-
tions during an information systems development [4]. Firstly there is the security
enhanced actor model (SEAM). This model is used to identify and analyse actors
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Table 1: ISSRM domain model concepts alignment to Secure TROPOS constructs.
Adapted from [4].
ISSRM construct Secure Tropos Construct
Asset 1) Actor, hard goal, plan, resource, secure goal
2) Composition of actor, hard goal, plan, resource, se-
cure goal using dependency, means-end, contribution
and decomposition relationships.
Business asset 1) Actor, hard goal, plan, resource, secure goal
2) Composition of actor, hard goal, plan, resource, se-
cure goal using dependency, means-end, contribution
and decomposition relationships.
IS Asset 1) Actor, hard goal, plan, resource, secure goal.
2) Composition of actor, hard goal, plan, resource, se-
cure goal using dependency, means-end, contribution
and decomposition relationships.
Security criterion Soft goal, security constraint, contribution, security con-
straint decomposition.
Risk Combination of a threat element and impacts relation-
ship.
Event 1)Composition of an actor, goal, plan, targets, exploits
and vulnerability point.
2) Threat element.
Impact Impact relationship
Threat 1) Goal
2) Plan
Vulnerability Vulnerability is not modelled, but vulnerability points
can be identified by the attributes of the assets.
Threat agent Agent
Attack method Plan
Risk treatment -
Security requirements 1) Actor, hard goal, plan, resource, secure goal.
2) Composition of actor, hard goal, plan, resource, se-
cure goal using dependency, means-end, contribution
and decomposition relationships.
Controls 1) Actor, hard goal, plan, resource, secure goal.
2) Composition of actor, hard goal, plan, resource, se-
cure goal using dependency, means-end, contribution
and decomposition relationships.
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of the environment and system and dependency relationships between those ac-
tors [4]. Second model is the security enhanced goal model (SEGM). SEGM model
completes SEAM model with how actors reason about their goals, plans and re-
sources. SEGM model elements are linked to one another by the means-ends,
decomposition and contribution relationships [4].
2.3 Security Risk-Oriented BPMN
Business process model and notation (BPMN) is meant for modeling business
processes. It allows to study and evaluate organization's processes so that the pro-
cesses add value to organization and its customers [7]. BPMN is considered being
business-friendly, because it uses same approach notions as traditional flowcharting
[8]. BPMN uses graphical elements, that are are familiar to most modellers and
all elements used in BPMN have specific meaning, defined rules and connections
between them [8].
Major BPMN constructs according to [9] are pool, which is a container for a
process. Lane, which divides pool into smaller parts. Task describes an activity.
Event is used for signalling that something happens during the process. Sequence
flow connects activities, gateways and events in the pool. Message flow is used for
sending messages between different pools. Gateways express control points in the
process. Data stores and data objects are connected to tasks with data association
relationships. Annotation is used to represent text about objects, annotations are
connected to objects using association relationship [9].
The BPMN language is not designed for security modeling, but its domain
model can be extended to take security problems into account as well. Multiple
papers, that propose extensions for BPMN to support security modelling have
been published. For the tool to be developed we use [8] work. Altuhhova proposed
in [8] how BPMN could be extended to security risk-oriented BPMN so it does
not lose its original purpose, but could be used to model security aspects as well.
Table 2 shows alignment between Security Risk-oriented BPMN constructs and
ISSRM domain model concepts.
Starting with ISSRM domain model asset-related concepts. Combination of
events, gateways, tasks and sequence flow is used for representing organization's
valuable assets (both business and IS assets [8]. Labels are used to differ task
asset type. Data object can be used for representing business asset [8]. Data
stores, containers and pools support business assets and are therefore mapped to
IS assets. For constraint a new construct "lock" is proposed. The letter inside
lock element describes the business assets security objective [8]. Annotation is
used for giving additional information. Since constructs are aligned to different
ISSRM domain model concepts Altuhhova proposes also to use different color for
depicting different concepts. Asset-related concepts are presented like in normal
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Table 2: ISSRM domain model concepts alignment to BPMN constructs. Adapted
from [4, 8].
ISSRM construct BPMN Construct
Asset Combination of flow objects(event, gateway, activity)
using sequence flow
Business asset Data object
IS Asset a) Data store
b) Containers
Supports a) Container supports combination of Flow Objects
(Business assets) by containing them.
b) Sequence flow between Flow Objects
c) Data association flow between task and data object
and task and data store
Constraint of a) Lock and Association Flow, which point from the
Lock to an Annotation.
b) Lock is a property of constructs that describe business
assets.
Security criterion Annotation
Security objective Property of a Lock that can have a value
Risk Combination of event and outcome
Event Combination of constructs for Threat and Vulnerability
Impact a) Unlock
b) Unlock is a property of constructs that describe the
Business assets.
Threat Combination of construct for Threat Agent and Attack
method.
Vulnerability Annotation
Threat agent Pool and Lane
Attack method Combination of events, gateways and activities
Risk treatment -
Security requirements Combination of flow objects.
Controls -
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BPMN black border, risk-related concepts are marked with red and risk treatment-
related concepts with blue. Using colors helps to keep the models clearer and easier
to understand [8].
For ISSRM risk-related concepts new element "Vulnerability point" was intro-
duced. It is part of characteristics of concept from ISSRM. Vulnerability point is
an property of constructs that describe data objects and tasks. Textual annota-
tion is used for describing vulnerability. Pools and lanes are used for expressing
threat agents. Attack method is composed of sequence flow and flow objects. [8]
also introduces new element "unlock", which presents impact, harms and negates
relationships. It is portrayed as an open lock, letter inside the lock represents
which security criterion was broken. Complex concepts threat, event and risk are
compositions of other concepts.
For risk treatment-related concepts only security requirements and mitigates
relationship was defined by [8]. Combination of flow objects and sequence flow is
used for representing those concepts. Other risk treatment-related concepts were
found to be inessential and extensive for being depicted in the process diagram.
It was said, that other concepts should be mentioned as a textual annotation or
added to the description or report of the model.
2.4 Security Risk-Oriented Misuse Cases
Use case is a set of actions or events to describe the interaction between an actor
and system for an actor to achieve some goal. An actor may be an user or another
system. An "include" relationship defines that a use case contains the behaviour
defined in another use case. An "extends" relationship specifies an extended be-
haviour of the targeted use case [4].
Misuse cases [10] extend standard use cases and show how an actor may be
able to exploit the system and cause harm to stakeholders [11, 12]. In [13] Secu-
rity Risk-Oriented Misuse Case (SROMUC) is developed and described in detail
how the constructs of SROMUC align to ISSRM domain model concepts. Follow-
ing chapters describe SROMUC alignment to ISSRM domain model [13]. Table
3 shows alignment between Security Risk-oriented Misuse cases constructs and
ISSRM domain model concepts.
Regarding asset-related concepts: assets in ISSRM domain model are modelled
as Actor and Use case in SROMUC. The business assets are represented as use
cases. System assets can be either use cases or system boundaries [4]. The ISSRM
domain model supports relationship between business asset and system asset is
expressed using extends and includes relationships. For security criterion concept
new type (security criterion) of use case is added to SROMUC. It is linked to
business asset with constraint of relationship.
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Table 3: ISSRM domain model concepts alignment to Misuse case constructs.
Adapted from [4, 13].
ISSRM construct Misuse Case Construct
Asset Actor
Business asset (Business) Use case
IS Asset (IS) Use case
System boundary
Supports 1) include relationship
2) Extend relationship
Security criterion Security criterion
Constraint of Constraint of relationship
Risk Combination of constructs used to express event and
impact
Impact Impacts stereotype
Event Combination of constructs used to express threat and
vulnerability.
Attack method Misuse cases
Vulnerability Vulnerability stereotype
Threat agent Misuser
Threat Combination of misuser and misuse case using commu-
nication link
Targets threaten link
Exploits exploit link
Negates negate link
Harms harm link
Lead to lead to link
Characteristic of include link
Risk treatment -
Security requirements (Security) use case.
Controls -
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Risk-related concepts: misuser corresponds to threat agent, misuse case repre-
sents attack method concept. For vulnerability a new type of use case (vulnerabil-
ity) is used. ISSRM targets relationship is modelled as threatens relationship in
SROMUC. In order to comply to ISSRM domain model, SROMUC introduces new
Impact stereotype and 4 new relationships: exploits, leads to, harms and negates.
Exploits relationship defines a link between vulnerability and misuse case, leads to
links misuse case to impact. Harms relationship links impact to business use case
and negates connects impact and security criterion. Threat concept is combination
of misuser and misuse case using the communication link. Event is a combination
of constructs used to represent threat and vulnerability, whereas risk is combina-
tion of constructs used for modelling event and impact. In risk treatment-related
concepts SROMUC updates the graphical representation of security use case by
adding a padlock to it. The padlock represents security requirement. The ISSRM
domain model mitigates relationship is modelled with SROMUC mitigates link
between security use case and misuse case. For controls and risk treatment there
is no correspondence given.
2.5 Mal-Activities for Security Risk Management
Activity diagrams represent behaviour of system. They include step by step actions
and activities and support choice, iteration and concurrency [4]. Activity diagrams
can be used to model both computational and organizational processes.
Mal-activity diagrams (MAD) deal with behavioural aspects of security prob-
lems [4]. They are constructed by extending activity diagram concepts [14]. Mal-
activity diagrams are mostly build against activity diagrams with a goal of achiev-
ing systems unwanted behaviour. Mal-activity diagrams introduce mal-activity,
mal-swimlane and mal-decision, which are opposite to activity diagrams activity,
swimlane and decision [14]. Alignment of MAD constructs to ISSRM domain
model concepts are shown in the Table 4.
In [15] alignment between ISSRM domain model concepts and MAD is pro-
posed. In ISSRM domain model business asset is defined as information, process
or skill that is needed for business objectives. Activity diagrams show business
workflow by combining activity and decision constructs connected by control flow
relationship. So these constructs are aligned to ISSRM business assets. In addi-
tion data is recognised as business asset as well [15]. In [15] it is said that ISSRM
IS assets could be represented using swimlane, decision, activity and control flow.
In [15] no alignment is given for security criterion concept, but in [4] it is pro-
posed that security constraint can be represented as an informal comment linked
to business asset.
Regarding risk-related concepts: in MAD mal-swimlane is used for representing
malicious actor, therefore mal-swimlane is aligned to ISSRM threat agent concept.
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Table 4: ISSRM domain model concepts alignment to Malactivity diagram con-
structs. Adapted from [4, 15].
ISSRM construct Mal-activity diagram Construct
Asset Process described using activity, decision and con-
trolflow constructs
Business asset (Implicit) Objects used to perform activities
IS Asset Swimlane
Supports Controlflow
Security criterion Linked comment to business asset
Constraint of Linked comment to business asset
Risk Combination of constructs representing event and im-
pact.
Impact Mal-activity
Event Combination of constructs used to express threat and
vulnerability.
Vulnerability Linked as a comment to vulnerable assets
Threat Combination of constructs representing threat agent and
attack method
Threat agent Mal-swimlane
Attack method a) Process described using Mal-activity, Mal-decision
and control flows.
b) Swimlane (as means to perform the attack)
Risk treatment -
Security requirement Mitigation activity
Controls Swimlane
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Inverses of decision and activity mal-decision and mal-activity combined with con-
trol flow are aligned to ISSRM attack method concept. Since malicious actor could
use means defined as mal-swimlane, mal-swimlane construct is aligned to attack
method concept as well [15]. MAD does not include constructs for representing
vulnerability, so [4] has introduced comment linked to vulnerable system assets
for alignment to ISSRM vulnerability concept. In MAD ISSRM impact concept
could be expressed as mal-activity. ISSRM threat is a combination of constructs
used to represent threat agent and attack method. Event is a combination of con-
structs used to represent threat and vulnerability, whereas risk is combination of
constructs used for modelling event and impact.
Risk treatment-related concepts. MAD Mitigation activity is aligned to ISSRM
security requirement concept and since swimlane is used for holding mitigation
activities, it is aligned to ISSRM control concept.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we described ISSRM domain model, what concepts it consists of and
why it is important. We answered research question 1 "How are secure modelling
languages aligned to ISSRM domain model?". For that we examined security risk-
aware secure TROPOS, security risk-oriented BPMN, security risk-oriented misuse
cases, mal-activities for security risk management and their proposed alignments
to ISSRM domain model. In the next chapter we answer research question 2 by
identifying users goals, use case scenarios and setting functional and non-functional
requirements for the tool.
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3 A Tool for Multi-Perspective Security Risk Man-
agement
This chapter describes the tool to be developed for this thesis and answers research
question 2 "What are the requirements for tool to help the users learn alignment
to ISSRM domain model concepts and transformations between secure modelling
langauges?". Firstly we talk about why is the solution needed and to whom is
the tool targeted at. After explaining the motivation, we go through requirements
engineering process by analysing users goals. For satisfying the goals we create
use cases and scenarios. From these we can derive functional and non-functional
use cases for the solution to be developed. We also introduce the layout of the
solutions UI by showing mockups and explaining it in detail.
3.1 Tool Description
Tool is developed for education purpose and is to be used as an learning instrument
for students in courses where secure modelling languages and ISSRM domain model
are taught. The tool concentrates on Security risk management, Alignments be-
tween constructs and concepts and Modelling languages, therefore the tool shall be
called SAM. SAM should help the student in understanding and learning security
risk-oriented BPMN, security risk-aware secure TROPOS, security risk-oriented
misuse cases and mal-activities for security risk management diagram construct
alignments to ISSRM domain model concepts. For that SAM combines three main
elements of modelling using secure modelling language. Firstly the metamodel of
modelling language, this shows what elements the language consists of and how
the elements are connected to each other. Secondly the graphical representation
of constructs and thirdly the alignments between language constructs and ISSRM
domain model concepts. Since SAM shows ISSRM domain model concepts align-
ment to modelling language constructs, it would also help the users learn how to
transform from one security risk-oriented modelling language to another security
risk-oriented language.
3.2 Requirements and Design
This chapter describes in detail the requirements engineering process. For identi-
fying users and systems goals we use TROPOS modelling technique. From discov-
ered goals we derive scenarios. Based on created scenarios we can derive solution
oriented functional requirements for SAM. In addition to functional requirements,
SAM also needs to meet some non-functional requirements.
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3.2.1 Analysis of User's Goals
The process of requirements engineering starts with identifying and analysing users
and SAMs goals. For this we use TROPOS modelling technique. TROPOS model
also helps to understand what resources and tasks are needed in order to satisfy
identified hard goals and satisfice the soft goals. Figure 2 shows the created TRO-
POS model for user and SAM. Model has two actors: user and SAM. Since the
tools main purpose should be to help the user learn and understand how to add
security to models by using secure modelling language extensions the main soft
goals identified for the user are:
1. SG1 Learn secure modelling
2. SG2 Learn alignment between language construct and ISSRM domain model
concepts
3. SG3 Learn transformations between modelling languages.
Hard goals that help the user to satisfice his soft goals are:
1. HG1 See modelling language element's graphical representation
2. HG2 See modelling language's metamodel
3. HG3 See language's construct alignment to ISSRM domain model concepts
4. HG4 See modelling language constructs used to represent ISSRM domain
model concepts
All identified hardgoals depend on resources from SAM in order to be met.
HG1 depends on the graphical representation of the modelling language. HG2
depends on SAM displaying the metamodel. HG3 and HG4 both depend on SAM
to show the alignment between language model construct and ISSRM domain
model concept. Soft goals set for SAM are similar to user's soft goals, if the
goal of the user is to learn alignments between modelling languages then SAM's
corresponding soft goal is to help the user lean those alignments. For user's soft
goal to learn transformations between modelling languages, SAM's soft goal is
to help the user learn those transformations. For satisficing its sof goals, SAM
has supporting hard goals such as displaying language construct alignment to
ISSRM domain model concepts, displaying modelling language's metamodels and
displaying modelling language's graphical representation.
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Figure 2: Analysis of user's goals
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3.2.2 Scenarios
From identified user goals in previous chapter use case scenarios can be derived.
This chapter focuses on creating and explaining in detail derived use case scenarios.
Figure 3 presents all scenarios created to help the user and SAM fulfil set goals.
All use case scenarios for interaction between SAM and user are described using
textual and template representation. Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 describe the
use cases in detail using template representation.
Figure 3: User scenarios
Use case 1 is described in Table 5. This use case shows how the user can
see modelling language's metamodel to satisfy his hard goal HG2 which helps
to satisfice softgoals SG1 and SG2. Four buttons for modelling languages are
displayed to the user. If the button with language's name is green, it means that
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that modelling language is not chosen and its metamodel is not displayed to the
user. If the user clicks button, the metamodel should be displayed on the screen
and clicked button should be colored red, indicating that this modelling language
is currently chosen and its metamodel is displayed to the user.
Table 5: Use Case 1: See modelling language metamodel
Use Case Id UC-1
Goal number HG2
Use Case Name See modelling language metamodel.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User wishes to see modelling language's metamodel.
Preconditions Language's metamodel is not already visible to the user.
Postconditions 1. Language's metamodel is displayed to the user.
2. Button with language's name is colored red.
Normal flow 1. User decides which language's model he wants to see.
2. User clicks on green button with language's name.
3. SAM displays chosen language's metamodel on the
screen.
4. SAM changes button with language's name color to
red.
Use case 2 is described in Table 6. Use case 2 has opposite effect from use case
1. It describes how the user can undo use case 1, if he no longer wishes to see
chosen language's metamodel. If language's button is colored red, it indicates that
the language is chosen and can now be unchosen. If the user clicks the button with
langauges name, SAM stops displaying that languages metamodel and constructs
if constructs were shown to the user. Button with languages name colors back to
green indicating that this language is currently not chosen and can be chosen if
the user wishes to.
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Table 6: Use Case 2: Remove modelling language from chosen languages.
Use Case Id UC-2
Goal number -
Use Case Name Remove modelling language from chosen languages.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User wishes to remove previously chosen modelling lan-
guage.
Preconditions User has chosen at least one modelling language.
Postconditions Modelling language's metamodel is no longer displayed to
the user.
Button with language's name is green.
Normal flow 1. User decides which language to unchoose.
2. User clicks on red button with languages name.
3. SAM stops displaying language's metamodel on the
screen.
4. SAM changes language's button with language's name
color to green.
Use case 3 is described in Table 7. This use case shows how the user can
see all modelling language's constructs that are aligned to ISSRM domain model
asset-related concepts. This use case helps to satisfy TROPOS model goals HG1
and HG4. For simplicity the user can see all constructs that are aligned to one
or more asset-related concepts with a click of a single button. The only precon-
dition for this is that atleast one modelling language is chosen (its metamodel is
shown to the user). After clicking the "Select Asset-related" button, all elements
of modelling language metamodel, that are aligned to asset-related concept are
highlighted. Different concepts are colored differently. If one construct can be
used for representing multiple ISSRM domain mode concepts, its metamodel rep-
resentation is colored with multiple colors. Graphical representations of modelling
constructs are displayed to the user for all highlighted constructs.
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Table 7: Use Case 3: See constructs used for representing asset-related concepts.
Use Case Id UC-3
Goal number HG1, HG4
Use Case Name See constructs used for representing asset-related con-
cepts.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User wishes to see all constructs used for representing
asset-related ISSRM domain model concepts.
Preconditions User has selected at least one modelling language.
Postconditions 1. Chosen language's metamodel constructs which are
aligned with asset-related ISSRM domain model concepts
are colored.
2. Graphical representations of all colored constructs are
displayed to the user.
3. All asset-related concept names in legend are colored
green.
Normal flow 1. User clicks "Select Asset-related" button.
2. SAM colors all elements of chosen language's meta-
model(s), that are aligned to one or more asset-related
ISSRM domain model concept(s).
3. SAM changes color of text "Business asset" in legend
to green.
4. SAM changes color of text "System asset" in legend to
green.
5. SAM changes color of text "Security Criterion" in leg-
end to green.
6. SAM displays graphical representations of all high-
lighted metamodel elements.
Use case 4 is described in Table 8. This use case shows how the user can see
all modelling language's constructs that are aligned to ISSRM domain model risk-
related concepts. This use case also helps to satisfy TROPOS model goals HG1
and HG4. Similarly to selecting asset-related concepts, all risk-related concepts
can be seen with a click of a single button as well. The precondition that atleast
one modelling language is chosen applies for this use case as well. After clicking
the "Select Risk-related" button, all elements of modelling language metamodel,
that are aligned to risk-related concept are highlighted. Different concepts are
colored differently. If one construct can be used for representing multiple ISSRM
domain mode concepts, its metamodel representation is colored with multiple col-
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ors. Graphical representations of modelling constructs are displayed to the user
for all highlighted constructs.
Table 8: Use Case 4: See constructs used for representing risk-related concepts.
Use Case Id UC-4
Goal number HG1, HG4
Use Case Name See constructs used for representing risk-related concepts.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User wishes to see all constructs used for representing risk-
related ISSRM domain model concepts.
Preconditions User has selected at least one modelling language.
Postconditions 1. Chosen language's metamodel constructs which are
aligned with risk-related ISSRM domain model concepts
are colored.
2. Graphical representations of all colored constructs are
displayed to the user.
3. All risk-related concept names in legend are colored
green.
Normal flow 1. User clicks "Select Risk-related" button.
2. SAM colors all elements of chosen language's meta-
model(s), that are aligned to one or more risk-related IS-
SRM domain model concept(s).
3. SAM changes color of text "Risk" in legend to green.
4. SAM changes color of text "Event" in legend to green.
5. SAM changes color of text "Impact" in legend to green.
6. SAM changes color of text "Threat" in legend to green.
7. SAM changes color of text "Vulnerability" in legend to
green.
8. SAM changes color of text "Threat Agent" in legend
to green.
9. SAM changes color of text "Attack method" in legend
to green.
10. SAM displays graphical representations of all high-
lighted metamodel elements.
Use case 5 is described in Table 9. This use case shows how the user can see
all modelling language's constructs that are aligned to ISSRM domain model risk
treatment-related concepts. This use case satisfies TROPOS model goals HG1
and HG4. With a click of one button, the user can see constructs aligned to every
risk treatment-related concept. Atleast one modelling language must be chosen
in order to start this use case. After clicking the "Select Risk Treatment-related"
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button, all elements of modelling language metamodel, that are aligned to risk
treatment-related concepts are highlighted. Different concepts are colored differ-
ently. If one construct can be used for representing multiple ISSRM domain mode
concepts, its metamodel representation is colored with multiple colors. Graphical
representations of modelling constructs are displayed to the user for all highlighted
constructs.
Table 9: Use Case 5: See constructs used for representing risk treatment-related
concepts.
Use Case Id UC-5
Goal number HG1, HG4
Use Case Name See constructs used for representing risk treatment-related
concepts.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User wishes to see all constructs used for representing risk
treatment-related ISSRM domain model concepts.
Preconditions User has selected at least one modelling language.
Postconditions 1. Chosen language's metamodel constructs which are
aligned with risk treatment-related ISSRM domain model
concepts are colored.
2. Graphical representations of all colored constructs are
displayed to the user.
3. All risk treatment-related concept names in legend are
colored green.
Normal flow 1. User clicks "Select Risk Treatment-related" button.
2. SAM colors all elements of chosen language's meta-
model(s), that are aligned to one or more risk treatment-
related ISSRM domain model concept(s).
3. SAM changes color of text "Risk Treatment" in legend
to green.
4. SAM changes color of text "Security Requirement" in
legend to green.
5. SAM changes color of text "Control" in legend to green.
6. SAM displays graphical representations of all high-
lighted metamodel elements.
Use case 6 is described in Table 10. Use case 6 helps the user satisfy goals HG1
and HG3. Precondition for this use case is that atleast one modelling language is
chosen by the user and its metamodel is displayed to the user. When user clicks
on construct in metamodel, a list of all ISSRM domain model concepts that are
aligned to that construct is displayed. When user selects and clicks on one ISSRM
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domain model concept from list, all constructs aligned to that concept are colored
in displayed metamodel. Graphical representations of modelling constructs are
displayed to the user for all highlighted metamodel constructs. Concept name is
colored green in legend indicating that concept's alignments are shown to the user.
Table 10: Use Case 6: Select ISSRM concept for language construct.
Use Case Id UC-6
Goal number HG1, HG3
Use Case Name See constructs used for representing risk treatment-related
concepts.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User wishes to select an ISSRM domain model concept
aligned to modelling language construct.
Preconditions User has selected at least one modelling language.
Postconditions 1. Chosen language's metamodel constructs which are
aligned to selected concept are colored.
2. Graphical representations of all colored constructs are
displayed to the user.
3. Selected concept name in legend is colored green.
Normal flow 1. User clicks on modelling language construct in meta-
model.
2. SAM displays all ISSRM concepts that are aligned to
that construct.
3. User clicks on an ISSRM domain model concept.
4. SAM colors all constructs aligned to concept selected
in step 3.
5. SAM changes color of concept name in legend to green.
6. SAM displays graphical representations of all high-
lighted metamodel elements.
Table 11 describes use case 7. Use case 7 describes the interactions that help the
user to satisfy goals HG1 and HG4. Precondition for this use case is that atleast
one modelling language is chosen by the user. In order to see all constructs that are
aligned to specific ISSRM domain model concept the user can click on concept's
name. Clicking on the concept's name selects the concept and all metamodel
constructs that are aligned to selected concept are colored. Metamodel construct
color matches the color shown to the user in legend. When an ISSRM domain
model concept is selected, its name is colored green. If the concept is not selected
its name is displayed to the user with black color.
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Table 11: Use Case 7: See modelling language constructs that can represent ISSRM
domain model concept.
Use Case Id UC-7
Goal number HG1, HG4
Use Case Name See modelling language constructs that can represent IS-
SRM domain model concept.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User wishes to choose an ISSRM domain model concept
and see all modelling language's constructs aligned to it.
Preconditions 1. User has selected at least one modelling language.
2. The ISSRM domain model concept user wants to see
aligned constructs for is not already shown to the user.
Postconditions 1. Chosen language's metamodel constructs which are
aligned to user chosen ISSRM domain model concept are
colored.
2. Graphical representations of all colored modelling lan-
guage constructs are displayed to the user.
3. Selected concept name in legend is colored green.
Normal flow 1. User clicks on ISSRM domain model concept name in
legend.
2. SAM colors all constructs aligned to selected concept.
3. SAM changes color of concept name in legend to green.
4. SAM displays graphical representations of all high-
lighted metamodel elements.
Table 12 describes use case 8. UC-8 desribe two flows how the user can deselect
an ISSRM domain model concept. Preconditions for both flows are that modelling
language's metamodel is displayed and atleast one ISSRM domain model concept is
selected. First way to deselect ISSRM domain model concept is to click on its name
in legend. Second way is to click on modelling language construct that is aligned to
that concept. Then a list of all aligned concepts is shown to the user. If user clicks
on the selected concept's name, then the concept is deselected. Postconditions for
both flows are the same: Deselected concept name is displayed as black colored
text. Metamodel constructs are no longer colored with the color representing
that ISSRM domain model concept. If no ISSRM domain model concepts are
selected any more then all constructs are colored white. If all constructs are colored
white then no graphical representations of modelling constructs are displayed to
the user, if some constructs are highlighted(colored) in metamodel then graphical
representations for those constructs are still displayed to the user.
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Table 12: Use Case 8: Deselect ISSRM domain model concept.
Use Case Id UC-8
Goal number -
Use Case Name Deselect ISSRM domain model concept.
Actors 1. User
2. SAM
Trigger User no longer wishes to see language construct that are
aligned to domain mode concept.
Preconditions 1. User has selected at least one modelling language.
2. User has selected at least one ISSRM domain model
concept.
Postconditions 1. Alignment to deselected ISSRM domain model concept
is no longer displayed to the user.
2. Deselected concept name in legend is colored black.
Normal flow 1. User clicks on ISSRM domain model concept name in
legend.
2. SAM removes color related to ISSRM domain model
concept from metamodel construct.
3. SAM changes color of concept name in legend to black.
Alternative flow 1. User clicks on modelling language construct in meta-
model.
2. SAM displays all ISSRM domain model concepts
aligned to clicked construct.
3. User clicks on ISSRM domain model concept. 4. SAM
removes color related to ISSRM domain model concept
from metamodel construct.
5. SAM changes color of concept name in legend to black.
3.2.3 Mockups
In addition to functional aspects of the tool, user interface is designed for the tool
as well. Figure 4 shows how the tool would look like once implemented. On the
left upper part of the screen the buttons for choosing and unchoosing modelling
languages are located. Bottom left part of the screen (legend part) lists all ISSRM
domain model concepts. Colored boxes show what color is used for representing
that concept. If concept text is green it means that the concept is active, unactive
concepts are marked with black text. Since all buttons and concepts don't fit
to the screen, the left pane is scrollable. Right top part of the window is where
languages' metamodels are located. Constructs aligned to active concepts are
colored respectfully. Bottom right part of window is dedicated for icons.
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Figure 4: Tool to be developed
3.2.4 Rules for Risk-Related Concepts
In ISSRM domain model some risk related concetps are combinations of its sub-
concepts. Risk is combination of event and impact, event is combination of threat
and vulnerability, vulnerability is combination of attack method and threat agent.
This means that in order for the risk to exist, event and impact must be present.
We want our tool to adhere to this condition as well. So rules which risk re-
lated concepts must be selected or deselected, when any risk related concept is
selected/deselected by user were created. Rules are following.
1. When user selects risk concept, then risk, event, impact, threat, vulnerabil-
ity, threat agent and attack method concepts are shown to the user.
2. When user deselects risk concept, then risk, event, impact, threat, vulnera-
bility, threat agent and attack method concepts are deselected.
3. When user selects event concept, then event, threat, vulnerability, threat
agent and attack method concepts are shown to user as well. If impact was previ-
ously selected, then risk concept is selected as well.
4. When user deselects event concept, then risk, event, threat, vulnerability,
threat agent and attack method are deselected. Impact selection is not changed.
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5. When user selects impact concept, then impact is show to the user and if
event was previously selected, then risk is selected as well.
6. When user deselects impact, then impact and risk are both deselected.
7. When user selects threat concept, then threat, threat agent and attack
method concepts are selected. If only vulnerability was previously selected then
event is also selected. If vulnerability and impact were both previously selected
then risk and event are selected as well.
8. When user deselects threat concept, then theat, threat agent and attack
method concepts are also deselected. If vulnerability was previously selected, then
event is deselected. If vulnerability and impact were both previously selected then
event and risk concepts are deselected as well.
9. When user selects vulnerability concept, then vulnerability concept is shown
to the user. If threat was previously selected then event is also shown. If threat
and impact were both previously selected then event and risk are shown.
10. When user deselects vulnerability concept, then event and risk concepts
are deselected.
11. When user selects threat agent concept, then threat agent concept is shown
to the user. If attack method was previously selected, then threat is also shown to
the user. If attack method and vulnerability were previously selected then threat
and event concepts are shown to the user as well. If attack method, vulnerability
and impact were all previously selected then risk, event and threat concepts are
shown to the user.
12. When user deselects threat agent concept, then threat, event and risk
concepts are deselected.
13. When user selects attack method concept, then attack method is shown
to the user. If threat agent was previously selected, then threat is also shown. If
threat agent and vulnerability were both previously selected then threat and event
are shown. If threat agent, vulnerability and impact were all previously selected
then risk, event and threat are shown.
14. When user deselects attack method concept, then threat, event and risk
are deselected.
3.2.5 Functional Requirements
Models, mockups and requirements scenarios are basis for written system require-
ments. Previous chapters' models, scenarios and mockups result in following func-
tional requirements. Requirements are ordered by scenarios ordering. If same
functional requirement applies for multiple scenarios, it is listed only in first use
case it applies to and is not duplicated under requirements for later scenarios.
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1. UC-1 See modelling language metamodel
1.1. If BPMN modelling language is not chosen, green button with lan-
guage's name is shown to the user.
1.2. If Secure TROPOS modelling language is not chosen, green button with
language's name is shown to the user.
1.3. If Misuse cases modelling language is not chosen, green button with
language's name is shown to the user.
1.4. If Malactivity diagrams modelling language is not chosen, green button
with language's name is shown to the user.
1.5. If BPMN modelling language is added to chosen languages, its meta-
model is displayed.
1.6. If Secure TROPOS modelling language is added to chosen languages,
its metamodel is displayed.
1.7. If Misuse cases modelling language is added to chosen languages, its
metamodel is displayed.
1.8. If Malactivity diagrams modelling language is added to chosen lan-
guages, its metamodel is displayed.
2. UC-2 Remove modelling language from chosen languages
2.1. If BPMN modelling language is chosen, red button with language's
name is shown to the user.
2.2. If Secure TROPOS modelling language is chosen, red button with lan-
guage's name is shown to the user.
2.3. If Misuse cases modelling language is chosen, red button with language's
name is shown to the user.
2.4. If Malactivity diagrams modelling language is chosen, red button with
language's name is shown to the user.
2.5. If BPMN modelling language is removed from chosen languages, its
metamodel is no longer displayed.
2.6. If Secure TROPOS modelling language is removed from chosen lan-
guages, its metamodel is no longer displayed.
2.7. If Misuse cases modelling language is removed from chosen languages,
its metamodel is no longer displayed.
2.8. If Malactivity diagrams modelling language is removed from chosen
languages, its metamodel is no longer displayed.
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3. UC-3 See constructs used for representing asset-related concepts
3.1. Button for selecting all ISSRM domain model concepts is displayed to
the user.
3.2. Button for selecting all asset-related ISSRM domain model concepts is
displayed to the user.
3.3. When button for selecting all ISSRM domain model concepts is clicked,
all ISSRM domain model concept names are colored green.
3.4. When button for selecting all asset-related ISSRM domain model con-
cepts is clicked, all asset-related ISSRM domain model concept names
are colored green.
3.5. When button for selecting all asset-related ISSRM domain model con-
cepts is clicked, all non asset-related ISSRM domain model concept
names are colored black.
4. UC-4 See constructs used for representing risk-related concepts
4.1. Button for selecting all risk-related ISSRM domain model concepts is
displayed to the user.
4.2. When button for selecting all risk-related ISSRM domain model con-
cepts is clicked, all risk-related ISSRM domain model concept names
are colored green.
4.3. When button for selecting all risk-related ISSRM domain model con-
cepts is clicked, all non risk-related ISSRM domain model concept
names are colored black.
5. UC-5 See constructs used for representing risk treatment-related concepts
5.1. Button for selecting all risk treatment -related ISSRM domain model
concepts is displayed to the user.
5.2. Button for deselecting all ISSRM domain model concepts is displayed
to the user.
5.3. When button for selecting all risk treatment-related ISSRM domain
model concepts is clicked, all risk treatment-related ISSRM domain
model concept names are colored green.
5.4. When button for selecting all risk treatment-related ISSRM domain
model concepts is clicked, all non risk treatment-related ISSRM domain
model concept names are colored black.
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5.5. When button for deselecting all ISSRM domain model concepts is clicked,
all ISSRM domain model concept names are colored black.
6. UC-6 Select ISSRM concept for language construct
6.1. Language constructs in metamodel must be clickable.
6.2. When metamodel construct is clicked, list of all aligned ISSRM domain
model concepts must be displayed to the user.
6.3. Already selected concepts are marked in the displayed list with checked
mark.
6.4. Concepts not selected are marked in the displayed list without checked
mark.
6.5. Clicking on unselected concept from the list selects the concept.
6.6. Clicking on selected concept from the list deselects the concept.
6.7. Metamodel elements aligned to selected ISSRM domain model concepts
are colored with same colors are shown in legend part next to concept
name.
6.8. All ISSRM domain model concepts are highlighted with different color.
6.9. ISSRM domain concepts must be highlighted with same color in all
languages' metamodels.
6.10. Icons representing highlighted constructs must be displayed to the user.
6.11. If one icon is used for multiple concepts, it is displayed only once.
6.12. Metamodel elements not aligned to selected ISSRM domain model con-
cepts have white background.
6.13. Disabling concept affects all chosen languages' metamodels.
7. UC-7 See modelling language constructs that can represent ISSRM domain
model concept
7.1. Clicking on unselected concept name in legend selects that concept.
7.2. All selected ISSRM domain model concepts' names are displayed with
green text.
8. UC-8 Deselect ISSRM domain model concept
8.1. Clicking on selected concept name in legend deselects that concept.
8.2. All deselected ISSRM domain model concepts' names are displayed with
black text.
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3.2.6 Non-Functional Requirements
1. After inital application startup, on averate selecting and deselecting concepts
should not take more than half a second.
2. Application must be available throughout the day.
3. Application must be usable using Google Chrome version Version 66.0.3359.181.
4. Application must support 50 concurrent users.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we answered research question 2 "What are the requirements for
tool to help the users learn alignment to ISSRM domain model concepts and trans-
formations between secure modelling langauges?". We gave an overview of the
solution to be developed. Analysed users needs and goals and based on identified
goals created use case scenarios and set functional and non-functional require-
ments. In the next chapter we are going to concentrate on validating the solution
described in this chapter.
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4 Validation
This chapter focuses on answering research questions 3 "How easy is to learn mod-
elling language alignment to ISSRM domain model concepts using the proposed
solution?" and 4 "How easy is to learn transformations between secure modelling
languages with help from tool which shows alignments to ISSRM domain model
concepts?". Chapter starts with describing the validation process and talks in de-
tail about results collected during the validation process. Results are analysed and
discussed. Validation chapter ends with identifying threats to done validation.
4.1 Description of the Validation Process
This chapter describes the validation process of created tool. Since the tool was
designed to be used for learning purposes in courses, that teach ISSRM domain
model and modelling using security risk-oriented languages, it was decided that
the validation of the tool will be done in a form of a questionnaire given to students
of "Principles of Secure Software Design" course. It was decided that the tool will
be introduced in one of the courses seminars.
First a short demo was done by the author to the students showing which
languages are supported by the tool. Author also showed the process of how the
tool can be used to see language construct mappings to ISSRM domain model
concepts and how to see which constructs can be used to represent ISSRM do-
main model concepts. After this demo a short questionnaire (questionnaire 1)
with 20 questions was given to the students. Questionnaire 1 had 4 sections, one
for each modelling language(BPMN, secure TROPOS, misuse cases, mal-activity
diagrams), for every language the questionnaire had 5 questions. Questions asked
which language constructs could be used in a language to represent some ISSRM
domain model concept. The students were given 15 minutes to answer all the
questions with help from using the tool. After 15 minutes had passed all questions
in the questionnaire were discussed and explained how the students could have
used the tool to get right answers.
Then another demo was done showing how students could benefit from the
tool when they need to transform from one modelling language to another, while
keeping the security aspects intact. After the demo another questionnaire (ques-
tionnaire 2) was given to the students. Questionnaire 2 consisted of 3 sections,
each section had 5 questions. Questions were about how to transform security
enhanced model from one modelling language to another. Once again the students
were given 15 minutes to answer the questionnaire with help from tool. After
15 minutes had passed all the questions in the questionnaire were discussed and
explained how the students could have used the tool to get the right answers.
After this third questionnaire was given to the students of the course. The third
36
questionnaire asked for students feedback about the tool. In the next chapter we
describe in detail the questions and responses collected from the students for the
third questionnaire.
4.2 Feedback Questionnaire
After process described in previous chapter the students were given third question-
naire, that gathered feedback about whether the students found that SAM fulfilled
its purpose and how much did SAM help them to see language mappings and help
with understanding transformations between security risk-oriented modelling lan-
guages.
The questionnaire consisted of 24 questions. Six questions for each language
supported by the tool(BPMN, secure TROPOS, misuse cases, mal-activity dia-
grams). The questionnaire was open for students from 22.03.2018 until 29.03.2018.
In total 32 students answered the feedback questionnaire. Seven answers from the
questionnaire were left out from analysation process. These seven responses were
not analyzed, because the answers to all the questions was same throughout the
entire questionnaire. It is probable to assume that those students just answered
the questionnaire because it was required from them by the teacher and did not
try to give real feedback and just chose the default answer to all questions. So
only 25 questionnaire results are described in this chapter.
First question "How easy is to understand language constructs alignment to
ISSRM domain model concept using the tool?" focused on getting student feedback
about the understandability of the tool regarding alignments between language
constructs and ISSRM domain model concepts. This question was asked for all
chosen languages separately. For BPMN 64 % of the answered students found it
rather easy or very easy to understand the alignment, 16 % found it moderate
and 20 % rather difficult. Figure 5 shows how the answers were distributed. For
Secure TROPOS 44 % of the answered students found it rather easy or very easy
to understand the alignment, 28 % found it moderate and 28 % rather difficult or
very difficult. Figure 6 shows how the answers were distributed. For Misuse cases
56 % of the answered students found it rather easy or very easy to understand
the alignment, 32 % found it moderate and 12 % rather difficult. Figure 7 shows
how the answers were distributed. For Malactivity diagrams 56 % of the answered
students found it rather easy or very easy to understand the alignment, 28 % found
it moderate and 16 % rather difficult or very difficult. Figure 8 shows how the
answers were distributed.
Second question was "How easy is to learn language constructs alignment to
ISSRM domain model concept using the tool?". This question was also asked for
all chosen languages separately. For BPMN 40 % of the answered students found it
rather easy or very easy to learn the alignment, 28 % found it moderate and 32 %
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Figure 5: How easy is to understand
BPMN language constructs align-
ment to ISSRM domain model con-
cept using the tool?
Figure 6: How easy is to understand
Secure TROPOS language constructs
alignment to ISSRM domain model
concept using the tool?
Figure 7: How easy is to under-
stand Misuse case language con-
structs alignment to ISSRM domain
model concept using the tool?
Figure 8: How easy is to understand
Malactivity diagram language con-
structs alignment to ISSRM domain
model concept using the tool?
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Figure 9: How easy is to learn BPMN
language constructs alignment to IS-
SRM domain model concept using
the tool?
Figure 10: How easy is to learn Se-
cure TROPOS language constructs
alignment to ISSRM domain model
concept using the tool?
rather difficult or very difficult. Figure 9 shows how the answers were distributed.
For Secure TROPOS 32 % of the answered students found it rather easy to learn
the alignment, 44 % found it moderate and 24 % rather difficult or very difficult.
Figure 10 shows how the answers were distributed. For Misuse cases 40 % of the
answered students found it rather easy or very easy to learn the alignment, 44 %
found it moderate and 16 % rather difficult. Figure 11 shows how the answers
were distributed. For Malactivity diagrams 32 % of the answered students found
it rather easy or very easy to learn the alignment, 48 % found it moderate and 20
% rather difficult. Figure 12 shows how the answers were distributed.
Third question was "How easy is to remember language constructs alignment
to ISSRM domain model concept using the tool?". Like previous questions this
question was also asked for all chosen languages separately. For BPMN 28 % of the
answered students found it rather easy or very easy to remember the alignment to
ISSRM domain model, 44 % found it moderate and 28 % rather difficult or very
difficult. Figure 13 shows how the answers were distributed. For Secure TROPOS
36 % of the answered students found it rather easy to remember the alignment to
ISSRM domain model, 36 % found it moderate and 28 % rather difficult or very
difficult. Figure 14 shows how the answers were distributed. For Misuse cases
36 % of the answered students found it rather easy or very easy to remember the
alignment, 44 % found it moderate and 20 % rather difficult or very difficult. Figure
15 shows how the answers were distributed. For Malactivity diagrams 24 % of the
answered students found it rather easy or very easy to remember the alignment to
ISSRM domain model, 52 % found it moderate and 24 % of the students found it
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Figure 11: How easy is to learn Mis-
use case language constructs align-
ment to ISSRM domain model con-
cept using the tool?
Figure 12: How easy is to learn
Malactivity diagram language con-
structs alignment to ISSRM domain
model concept using the tool?
rather difficult or very difficult. Figure 16 shows how the answers were distributed.
Figure 13: How easy is to remember
BPMN language constructs align-
ment to ISSRM domain model con-
cept using the tool?
Figure 14: How easy is to remember
Secure TROPOS language constructs
alignment to ISSRM domain model
concept using the tool?
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Figure 15: How easy is to remem-
ber Misuse case language constructs
alignment to ISSRM domain model
concept using the tool?
Figure 16: How easy is to remember
Malactivity diagram language con-
structs alignment to ISSRM domain
model concept using the tool?
Fourth question was "How easy is to understand transformations from one
language to another with help from the tool?". This question was in 3 different
forms. Using the tool made understanding transformations from BPMN to Secure
TROPOS rather easy or very easy for 52 % of the students, 20 % found it moderate
and 28 % rather difficult. Figure 17 shows how the answers were distributed.
Understanding transformations from Secure TROPOS to Misuse cases was rather
easy or very easy for 48 % of the answered students, 24 % found it moderate
and 28 % rather difficult. Figure 18 shows how the answers were distributed.
Transformations from Misuse cases to Malactivity diagrams were rather easy or
very easy to understand for 48 % of the answered students, 24 % of the students
found it moderate and 28 % rather difficult. Figure 19 shows how the answers
were distributed.
Fifth question was "How easy is to learn transformations from one language
to another with help from the tool?". This question was also asked for 3 types of
transformations between languages. Using the tool made understanding transfor-
mations from BPMN to Secure TROPOS rather easy or very easy for 32 % of the
students, 48 % found it moderate and 20 % very difficult or rather difficult. Fig-
ure 20 shows how the answers were distributed. Understanding transformations
from Secure TROPOS to Misuse cases was rather easy or very easy for 44 % of
the answered students, 36 % found it moderate and 20 % rather difficult. Figure
21 shows how the answers were distributed. Transformations from Misuse cases
to Malactivity diagrams were rather easy or very easy to understand for 36 % of
the answered students, 40 % of the students found it moderate and 24 % rather
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difficult. Figure 22 shows how the answers were distributed.
Figure 17: How easy is to understand
transformations from BPMN to Se-
cure TROPOS with help from the
tool?
Figure 18: How easy is to understand
transformations from Secure TRO-
POS to Misuse cases with help from
the tool?
Figure 19: How easy is to understand transformations from Misuse cases to Malac-
tivity diagrams with help from the tool?
Sixth question was "How easy is to remember transformations from one lan-
guage to another with help from the tool?". This question was also asked for 3
types of transformations between languages. Using the tool made understanding
transformations from BPMN to Secure TROPOS rather easy for 24 % of the stu-
dents, 56 % found it moderate and 20 % rather difficult. Figure 23 shows how the
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Figure 20: How easy is to learn trans-
formations from BPMN to Secure
TROPOS with help from the tool?
Figure 21: How easy is to learn trans-
formations from Secure TROPOS to
Misuse cases with help from the tool?
Figure 22: How easy is to learn transformations from Misuse cases to Malactivity
diagrams with help from the tool?
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answers were distributed. Understanding transformations from Secure TROPOS
to Misuse cases was rather easy for 24 % of the students, 52 % found it moder-
ate and 24 % rather difficult. Figure 24 shows how the answers were distributed.
Transformations from Misuse cases to Malactivity diagrams were rather easy to
understand for 24 % of the students who answered the questionnaire, 48 % of the
students found it moderate and 28 % rather difficult. Figure 25 shows how the
answers were distributed.
Figure 23: How easy is to remem-
ber transformations from BPMN to
Secure TROPOS with help from the
tool?
Figure 24: How easy is to remember
transformations from Secure TRO-
POS to Misuse cases with help from
the tool?
Figure 25: How easy is to remember transformations from Misuse cases to Malac-
tivity diagrams with help from the tool?
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4.3 Discussion
For the validation of the tool the feedback questionnaire is analyzed and midterm
exam results for exercises regarding alignment between language constructs and
ISSRM domain model concepts and transformations between modelling languages
are observed as well. Same 25 questionnaire responses looked into in the previous
chapter were chosen again. From the midterm exam all 50 exam results were taken.
In order to get statistical parameters such as mean and standard deviation,
the responses were transformed from text to numerical values in increasing order
of difficulty. Label "Very easy" was mapped changed to 1, "Rather easy" to 2,
"Moderate" to 3, "Rather difficult" to 4 and "Very difficult" was marked as 5.
Questions 1-3 of third questionnaire asked for feedback about understandability,
learnability and rememberability of alignments between ISSRM domain model
concepts and modelling language constructs. Means and standard deviations for
third questionnaire questions 1-3 are illustrated in table 13. Green cells indicate
below moderate results(under 3) and blue cells mark where average was equal to
moderate difficulty.
Question BPMN
Secure
TROPOS
Misuse
cases
Malactivity
diagrams
x¯ σ x¯ σ x¯ σ x¯ σ
How easy is to understand
language constructs align-
ment to ISSRM domain
model concept using the
tool?
2,44 0,96 2,88 1,05 2,44 0,87 2,56 0,82
How easy is to learn lan-
guage constructs alignment
to ISSRM domain model
concept using the tool?
2,96 1,06 3 0,91 2,68 0,85 2,84 0,8
How easy is to remember
language constructs align-
ment to ISSRM domain
model concept using the
tool?
3 0,91 2,92 0,95 2,84 0,9 3 0,87
Table 13: Means and standard deviations for feedback questions 1-3.
Taken from the students feedback average difficult of understanding language
construct alignment to ISSRM domain model concept with tool's help was be-
low moderate for all languages. For BPMN the average was 2,44 with standard
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deviation of 0,96, average for Secure TROPOS was 2,88 with standard deviation
of 1,05, respective numbers for Misuse cases were 2,44 and 0,87 and average for
Malactivity diagrams was 2,56 with standard deviation of 0,82. From these num-
bers it seems, that all alignments were rather easy to understand and Misuse cases
was the easiest. Regarding learning alignments between language constructs and
ISSRM domain model concepts BPMN average was 2,96 with standard deviation
of 1,06. For Secure TROPOS mean was 3 and standard deviation was 0,91. Mis-
use cases had an average of 2,68 with standard deviation of 0,85 and Malactivity
diagrams had an average of 2,84 with standard deviation of 0,8. Easiness of re-
membering BPMN language construct alignment to ISSRM domain model concept
was assessed by the students with average of 3 and standard deviation of 0,91. For
Secure TROPOS the indicators were 2,92 and 0,95. Misuse cases had an average
easiness of 2,84 with standard deviation of 0,9 and Malactivity diagrams had and
average easiness of 3 with standard deviation of 0,87.
From feedback questions it appears that the easiest language for the students
to understand, learn and remember alignments between constructs and concepts
was Misuse cases and hardest was secure TROPOS, the midterm exam results
confirm that. Average score for Misuse cases alignment related questions from
the midterm was 1,07, second best was BPMN with score of 0,92, followed by
Malactivity diagrams (0,71) and lowest points were received for exercises about
Secure TROPOS.
Questions 4-6 asked for feedback about understandability, learnability and re-
memberability of transforming from one modelling language to another after using
SAM. Means and standard deviations for questions 4-6 are illustrated in table 14.
Students feedback for easiness of understanding transformatios between lan-
guages was the following. Average easiness for understanding transformations from
BPMN to Secure TROPOS with the help of tool was 2,6 with standard deviation
of 1,08. Mean for transformations from Secure TROPOS to Misuse cases was 2,68
with standard deviation of 1,03. And for transformations from Misuse cases to
Malactivity diagrams the responding measures were same as for transformation
from Secure TROPOS to Misuse cases 2,68 and 1,03. Regarding learning transfor-
mations between languages, mean for BPMN to Secure TROPOS was 2,84 with
standard deviation of 0,94. From secure TROPOS to Misuse cases the average
was 2,72 and standard deviation was 0,98, for transformations from Misuse cases
to Malactivity diagrams mean was 2,84 with standard deviation of 0,99. Easi-
ness of remembering transformations from BPMN language to Secure TROPOS
was assessed by the students with average of 2,96 (standard deviation 0,68). For
transformations from Secure TROPOS to Misuse cases the average feedback was
that it was moderately easy to remember(3), standard deviation was 0,71. For
transformations from Misuse cases to Malactivity diagrams the mean score was
46
Question
BPMN to
Secure
TROPOS
Secure
TROPOS to
Misuse cases
Misuse cases
to Malactivity
diagrams
x¯ σ x¯ σ x¯ σ
How easy is to understand
transformations from one
language to another with
help from the tool?
2,6 1,08 2,68 1,03 2,68 1,03
How easy is to learn trans-
formations from one lan-
guage to another with help
from the tool?
2,84 0,94 2,72 0,98 2,84 0,99
How easy is to remember
transformations from one
language to another with
help from the tool?
2,96 0,68 3 0,71 3,04 0,73
Table 14: Means and standard deviations for feedback questions 4-6.
3,04 with standard deviation of 0,73. Similar to alignment related questions the
tool helped better with learning and understanding than with remembering.
From feedback questions it appears that with tools help, all transformations had
about the same difficulty levels. Best score were for BPMN to Secure TROPOS,
followed by Secure TROPOS to Misuse cases and Misuse cases to Malactivity
diagrams. In transformation related exercises in the midterm exam, the scores
for transformations were almost the same as well. BPMN to secure TROPOS
1,7 points, secure TROPOS to misuse cases 1,68 points and Misuse cases to mal-
activity diagrams 1,75 points.
4.4 Threats to Validation
This section describes the weakpoints of validating the tool with feedback survey
from the students. First threat to validation is that there was only 25 feedback
questionnaire answers analyzed. That is too small of a number for statistically
conclusive results for the practicality of the tool. Secondly the tool was shown to
students in the middle of the semester, so that they could use it for preparing some
exercise types of the exam. It was not given to them when they were starting the
course and they could only use it to revise for the exam not use it while they started
learning about the alignments. Most of the students answered the questionnaire
shorty after the seminar course in which the tool was introduced. Probably the
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results would have been different, if the students had had more time to use the
tool throughout the entire course.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we described the validation process of SAM, presented the results
for feedback questionnaire we used for answering research questions 3 and 4. We
analysed the results of the students questionnaire and compared them to midterm
exam results. Feedback questionnaire results indicate that the students benefited
from using SAM and found that SAM helped them learn, understand and remem-
ber language construct alignment s to different ISSRM domain model concepts.
Regarding using the tool to support understanding, learning and remembering
transformations between chosen languages the results were promising as well. The
averages and standard deviations for the questions about transformations show
that students found learning and understanding transformations while using the
tool's support rather easy to learn and understand. The difficulty of remembering
the transformations with help from the tool was around moderate.
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5 Conclusion
In this thesis we researched about existing security risk-oriented modelling lan-
guages extensions such as security risk-aware secure TROPOS, security risk-oriented
BPMN, security risk-oriented misuse cases and mal-activities for security risk man-
agement and their construct alignments to ISSRM domain model concepts. We
designed and implemented a tool SAM to support learning and understanding
these alignments and how to transform between chosen modelling languages. We
introduced SAM in "Principles of Secure Software Design" course and asked for
students feedback about the easiness of using the tool to learn and understand
alignments and transformations. This feedback was analysed and using the anal-
ysed results SAM was validated and found to be useful in that course.
5.1 Limitations
The developed tool uses alignments proposed in research papers discussed in Chap-
ter two, but some proposed modelling language extensions are not complete. In
some modelling languages, there are ISSRM domain model concepts, that have no
corresponding modelling language elements. Other current limitation of the tool
is that for some ISSRM domain model concepts, a set of language constructs is
shown. Since the tool currently does not provide and explain the transformation
rules, additional assistance from teacher or individual research may be needed with
learning the transformations.
5.2 Answers to Research Questions
In introduction we set four research questions for this thesis.
RQ1: How are secure modelling languages aligned to ISSRM domain
model? To answer this question, different secure extensions of modelling lan-
guages were chosen and different research papers studied to find currently pro-
posed alignments between ISSRM domain model and secure modelling languages.
RQ2: What are the requirements for tool to help the users learn align-
ment to ISSRM domain model concepts and transformations between
secure modelling langauges? In Contribution chapter we created a TROPOS
model for identifying the goals of users and SAM, from those goals we created
use cases for satisfying those goals. From use cases functional requirements were
derived. Also mockups describing the system's appearance were created.
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RQ3: How easy is to learn modelling language alignment to ISSRM
domain model concepts using the proposed solution? To answer this ques-
tion, we created a questionnaire for students in "Principles of Secure Software
Design". The questionnaire results indicated that the solution developed for this
master's thesis made it rather easy for students to learn alignments between IS-
SRM concepts and language constructs.
RQ4: How easy is to learn transformations between secure modelling
languages with help from tool which shows alignments to ISSRM do-
main model concepts? Answer to this question was taken from created ques-
tionnaire for students in "Principles of Secure Software Design" as well. The
questionnaire results indicated that the solution developed for this master's the-
sis made it rather easy for students to learn alignments between ISSRM concepts
and language constructs. Easiest being transformation from Secure TROPOS to
Misuse cases and a bit harder being the learning from BPMN to Secure TROPOS
and from Misuse cases to Malactivity diagrams.
5.3 Conclusion
The developed solution SAM was validated by analysing feedback from students of
"Principles of Secure Software Desgin" course. Results showed that SAM helped
the students learn, understand and remember alignments between ISSRM domain
model concepts and secure modelling language constructs. Since feedback results
were promising, hopefully SAM will be used in next years course to help the
students learn course topics regarding the alignments and transformations.
5.4 Future Work
Developed solution supports currently only 4 modelling languages. More secure
modelling languages could be added to be supported by the tool. Currently pro-
posed alignments are not complete, if they are improved, the tool should be im-
proved as well. Feedback about user experience was not collected, probably some
improvements could be made to improve it. Currently the tool supports seeing
alingments between ISSRM domain concepts and modelling language constructs.
Relationships are considered to be part of concept, in the future they could be
diverged so that the user could choose only relationships.
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